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ARGUMENT
I.

Ms. Acosta's Occupational Disease Claim Should Be Heard Because
The Claim Preclusion Requirements Were Not Satisfied.
A.

Ms. Acosta's Occupational Disease Claim Is Not Barred Because It
Was Not the Same Claim As Her Industrial Accident Claim.

The "same claim" requirement was not met because occupational diseases
and industrial accidents are not the same claims. As more fully set forth in Ms.
Acosta's brief, the Utah Occupational Disease Act ("UODA") gives rise to
occupational disease claims, while the Utah Worker's Compensation Act
("UWCA") gives rise to industrial accident claims, and each claim has its own
unique requirements. Aplt. Brief at 7-9. The facts show that Ms. Acosta plead an
industrial accident claim in 2000, dien plead an occupational disease claim in
2002, and that she plead different material facts in both claims. Aplt. Brief at x-xi
(Compare para. 1 with para.9).
In contrast, Appellee's brief spends eight pages laboring over the "same
claim" requirement, suggesting that industrial accident claims and occupational
disease claims may be the same claim. Respondent's mistakes stem from
mischaracterizing Ms. Acosta's cause of action for occupational disease.

Respondent argued that Ms. Acosta's occupational disease claim "relates to the
same subject matter or legal right - Ms. Acosta's entitlement to workers5
compensation medical and disability benefits as part of her work at Salt Lake
Regional" Aple. Brief at 15-16 (statutory citation omitted).
This statement embodies two fundamental flaws in Respondent's position:
1) The award of compensation and benefits is the same for both industrial accident
and occupational disease claims, so the claim must be the same; and, 2) Because
the award is the same, the requirements for entitlement the award are the same. As
to the first faulty premise, it is tantamount to arguing that personal injury claims
are the same as breach of contract claims because both claims may result in an
award of money damages. As to the second faulty premise, Ms. Acosta has no
right to compensation "as part of her work" for Appellees. Instead, Ms. Acosta
only has a right to compensation if she can plead and prove entitlement under
either statute, because she was injured in an industrial accident, or because she
was injured from an occupational disease; Ms. Acosta has no separate right to
compensation as part of her work for Appellees.
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Appellee's brief concluded that the claims were the same because they
"litigate the same subject matter . . . simply under a different theory of relief."
Aple. Brief at 21. In contrast, the subject matter at issue is statutory, and the
Legislature has created two separate claims - industrial accidents and occupational
diseases - over which the Labor Commission has jurisdiction. That does not
make Ms. Acosta's two separate claims the "same claim."
This Court should recognize that the Legislature created two causes of
action with separate requirements, that Ms. Acosta plead separate material facts
under each, and that they were not the "same claim." Because Ms. Acosta's
occupational disease claim was not the "same claim" as her occupational disease,
the claim was not barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.
R.

Ms. Acosta's Occupational Disease Claim Could Not Have Been
Plead Under the Facts of Her First Application For Industrial
Accident.

Nor do Ms. Acosta's facts meet the "could have" been raised requirement of
claim preclusion. The facts show that Ms. Acosta's first application for hearing
described a single injury event - lifting a baby out of an isolette. Aplt. App. at 1.

As set forth in her brief, occupational disease claims happen gradually over time.
Aplt. Brief at 7-9.l Ms. Acosta "could [not] have" raised an occupational disease
theory under the facts she plead.
Nor could Ms. Acosta have plead an occupational disease claim on the
Commission's own "Industrial Accident Only" Form. Aplt App at 1. The
Commission's arguments about an unarticulated "custom or practice" of
permitting alternative pleading is simply post-hoc justification for denying her
current application without a hearing on the merits. Instead, the facts show that
Ms. Acosta could not have raised an occupational disease theory without pleading
different material facts, and therefore the claim preclusion requirements are not
satisfied. This Court should remand Ms. Acosta's occupational disease claim for a
hearing on the merits.

1

There are exceptions that do not apply here. For example, a single
injurious exposure to asbestos may give rise to an occupational disease claim.
Luckau v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n. 840 P.2d 811 (Utah App 1992),
cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1983).
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C

Ms. Acosta's Facts Do Not Show That She "Should Have" Raised An
Occupational Disease Claim When She Filed Her Accident Claim.

Ms. Acosta "should [not] have" raised an occupational disease claim
because it arose out of separate facts not at issue in her first hearing. Appellee
suggests that all theories arising out of the same operative facts must be plead at
once. Aple. Brief at 25. Ms. Acosta does not dispute that general principle, but it
does not apply to her case. Instead, the facts of her industrial accident case did not
give rise to an occupational disease claim. Consequently there is no factual basis
to argue that she "should have" plead an occupational disease claim.
Moreover, Appellee's brief concedes that neither the UWCA, nor the
UODA require injured workers to simultaneously file all claim against the same
employer. Aple. Brief at 25. Yet, this is precisely Appellee's position. Appellee
suggests that injured workers should file all claims that arise out of the same
"transaction or occurrence." But the only common "transaction or occurrence"
between Ms. Acosta's two separate claims was her employment with the same
employer. As set forth more fully below, requiring employees to simultaneously
file all potential claims with the same employer would be unworkable, and create
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new problems that do not presently exist.
D.

Appellant's Position Is Poorly Defined, Would Violate The Statute,
And Would Make Litigation More Complex and Burdensome.

Appellee's implicit suggestion to simultaneously bring all claims between
the employee and the employer is confusing and ill-defined. Appellee suggests
that employees must file all claims arising out of the same "transaction or
occurrence," Aplt. Brief at 19 and 25, but in Ms. Acosta's case, the only common
transaction or occurrence between her industrial accident and occupational disease
was her employment relationship. If there is another common "transaction or
occurrence" between Ms. Acosta's industrial accident and occupational disease
claims, Appellees have failed to identify it for this Court. But if that is Appellee's
position, it would violate the Act and create new problems for litigants and Judges
at the Labor Commission.
Under Appellee's position, employees would have to file all claims with the
same employer, even where there were no disputes. Presently, the statute only
requires injured workers to file u[t]o contest an action of the employee's employer
or insurer." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-801(l)(a). Requiring employees to file all
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claims against the same employer, regardless of the dispute, would increase the
complexity of litigation, and unneccessarily consume limited judicial resources.
Also, where an employee failed to list a claim or potential claim, Appellee's
position would require Judges to dismiss claims on the merits without a hearing,
in violation of the Act. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(4)(b) states: "The Division
of Adjudication may dismiss a claim: (i) without prejudice; or, (ii) with prejudice
only if: (A) the Division of Adjudication adjudicates the merits of the employees'
entitlement to the compensation claimed in the Application for Hearing; or (B) the
employee fails to comply with (2)(a)(ii)." Respondent's argument is incompatible
with the plain language of the statute, and contrary to the legislature's stated
requirement that workers' compensation claims must be heard on the merits.
For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court should ignore Respondent's
suggestion that mandatory claim filing should be triggered by a "transaction or
occurrence" outside the industrial accident or occupational disease claim that is
plead by the injured worker.
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II.

There Is A Single Rule of Liberal Statutory Construction In Workers'
Compensation Cases, And It Is Irrespective Of Legal Counsel.
Appellees cite no authority for its argument that liberal construction should

differ based on who represented the injured worker. Aple. Brief at 26. This
argument ignores the purpose of the Act, which is to interpret the statute so that it
pays benefits to injured workers, if the statute permits. Vigos v. Mountainland
Builders. Inc.. 993 P.2d 207, 213 (Utah 2000). This Court should refrain from
adopting a sliding scale of statutory construction based on which lawyer
represented the injured worker, or if the injured worker proceeded pro se.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the Commission's conclusion that Ms. Acosta's
occupational disease claim was barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion. All
three requirements must be present to apply the doctrine, but none are present in
Ms. Acosta's case: 1) Her industrial accident and her occupational disease claim
are not the "same claim" because they arise from separate statutes with different
operative facts; 2) She "could [not] have" and "should [not] have" raised her
occupational disease claim under the facts she plead in her industrial accident
claim because her occupational disease claim arose under different material facts
that were not at issue. There is no "transaction or occurrence" that was common
to Ms. Acosta's claims except for her continued employment with Appellant, and
mere employment can not form the basis for filing workers' compensation claims.
Ms. Acosta's occupational disease claim should be heard on the merits, as
required by the statute. Her claim should not be barred for technical reasons that
are based on common law that does not apply, or that violates the UODA.
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